Andy Weber on Biological Preparedness: Why a Prepared Society Deters Attack

Andy Weber spent five and a half years as the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Before that he worked on securing weapons material from the former Soviet Union, and was among the American officials who got inside the former Soviet biological weapons production complex at Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, a facility built to make weaponized biological material on an industrial scale while the Soviet Union was formally committed to the Biological Weapons Convention.

That history shapes his argument, which he has made in Arms Control Today and, with Christine Parthemore, in War on the Rocks. It has two parts. First, COVID-19 showed how much damage a biological event can do to societies that aren't ready. Second, readiness is itself a form of deterrence.

Why biological threats are hard to deter the usual way

Nuclear deterrence rests on punishment: don't attack, because the retaliation will cost more than anything you gain. Biology complicates that. A disease may appear days after a release. For a long time nobody can say whether an outbreak is natural, accidental or deliberate. Attribution takes intelligence, laboratory work and international cooperation, and an attacker may count on that uncertainty for protection.

Weber and Parthemore's answer is what they call deterrence by denial. Instead of relying only on the threat of retaliation, make the attack unlikely to produce what the attacker wants. If an adversary expects that an unusual outbreak will be noticed quickly, identified in a laboratory, diagnosed by doctors, treated with stockpiled medicines, explained honestly to the public, and absorbed by institutions that keep working, then the weapon stops promising a catastrophe and starts promising a contained emergency.

The layers

Layer What it has to do
Detection Notice that something unusual is happening and identify what it is, early
Response Move information, diagnostics, medicines and people fast
Mitigation Reduce exposure and illness: ventilation, isolation, protective equipment, treatment
Attribution Establish whether it was deliberate, and who was responsible

These don't happen in order. Mitigation starts long before attribution, and protective measures may be needed while experts still disagree about what the agent is.

The COVID lesson

Weber's point about the pandemic wasn't that it was anything other than natural. It was that a natural pathogen overwhelmed health systems, broke supply chains for protective equipment and outran detection, in wealthy countries as much as poor ones. A society that struggled with that, he argued, should think carefully about how it would handle an event that was designed to be harder.

He also notes that the barriers to developing biological weapons aren't fixed. That's not a claim that any group could do it today. It's an argument against treating biodefense as something to improvise after a crisis starts. Richard Danzig has made a related argument about repeat attacks: see Danzig on bioterrorism as a campaign.

Where a household fits

Most of this is work for governments, laboratories and hospitals. Nothing a family buys contributes to national detection or attribution. But the mitigation layer does reach into the home, and it's the part a household controls:

  • Be able to stay home. Enough food, water and medication for a couple of weeks removes the need to go out during the worst of an outbreak.
  • Follow public health instructions. In a biological event this matters more than any equipment, because treatment after exposure, antibiotics for anthrax for instance, is often what saves lives.
  • Have respiratory protection that fits each person, for the situations where inhaling particles is the risk: an announced outdoor release, caring for someone infectious, or handling possibly contaminated material.

What a mask does here, honestly

Biological particles behave in the air like any other particles of their size, and a HEPA-class particle filter captures them the same way. It doesn't have to kill anything. So a sealed mask does reduce what you breathe in, and a full-face mask also protects the eyes, a route of infection for some agents.

What it doesn't do: give immunity, replace vaccination or treatment, help against something swallowed or absorbed through the skin, or work if it doesn't seal. Our masks aren't a NIOSH-approved assembly for occupational biological use; healthcare workers use certified equipment chosen for their tasks. And taking it off is part of the protection: the outside may be contaminated, so remove it carefully and wash your hands.

For a household: the Israeli 4A1 for clean-shaven adults, the Sapphire hood for beards and glasses, and for long wear, such as caring for someone ill, the ONYX 45 blower, which makes hours of use bearable. Children need the Quartz hood or a youth mask. Our guide to biological threats and respiratory protection goes into the detail.

On the technology side of the debate, see AI and biosecurity and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen on intent that outlasts failure.

Frequently asked questions

What is deterrence by denial?

Deterring an attack by making it unlikely to achieve its purpose, rather than only by threatening retaliation.

Do gas masks help against biological weapons?

A sealed mask with a HEPA-class filter reduces what you breathe in. It doesn't replace vaccines, medicines or public health measures.

Why is attribution so difficult?

Because disease appears days after release, and a deliberate release can look exactly like a natural outbreak at first.

About this article: it draws on "Pandemic Shows Need for Biological Readiness" by Andy Weber, Arms Control Today, 2021, and "A Deterrence by Denial Strategy for Addressing Biological Weapons" by Christine Parthemore and Andrew C. Weber, War on the Rocks, 2021. Andy Weber, Christine Parthemore, the Council on Strategic Risks, the US Department of Defense and NIOSH are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed it or its products. Analysis and recommendations are by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM. Former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch and former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority.

Primary Sources

  • Andy Weber — "Pandemic Shows Need for Biological Readiness," Arms Control Today, January/February 2021
  • Christine Parthemore and Andy Weber — "A Deterrence by Denial Strategy for Addressing Biological Weapons," War on the Rocks, September 23, 2021
  • Council on Strategic Risks — Andy Weber biography

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM; former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch; former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority. Andy Weber, Christine Parthemore, the United States Department of Defense, Arms Control Today, War on the Rocks, and the Council on Strategic Risks are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or any product offered by it.

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