Richard Danzig: Why a Biological Attack Should Be Planned For as a Campaign

In the autumn of 2001, letters containing anthrax spores passed through the US postal system. Twenty-two people were infected and five died, among them postal workers who had simply handled sealed mail. Most attention went to the immediate questions: who sent them, which buildings were contaminated, who needed antibiotics.

Richard Danzig asked a different one. What if the sender had more?

The person asking

Danzig was the 71st Secretary of the US Navy, from 1998 to 2001, after serving as Under Secretary. He later advised US intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense and became a senior adviser at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. His study for the National Defense University, "Preparing for Catastrophic Bioterrorism," wasn't about any particular group or pathogen. It was about a structural feature of biological threats that he thought American planning had missed.

The argument: biology allows repetition

The aircraft used on 11 September 2001 were consumed in the attack. A group that somehow obtained a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to have a dozen more. Biology is different. Whatever produced the first release may be able to produce more, and the attacker can choose a different city, wait for different weather, or come back to the same place once confidence has started to recover.

Danzig called this reload capability, and his conclusion was that bioterrorism should be planned for as a campaign rather than an incident. The strategic weight falls on the uncertainty. Should schools reopen if another city might be hit tomorrow? Should emergency staff and medicines be sent to the first city or held back? How does a government reassure people when it doesn't know whether the attacker has finished? A second release could cause fewer casualties than the first and still do more damage, because it proves the emergency wasn't contained.

His criticism of US preparedness was uncomfortable because it wasn't about money. It was that programs, agencies and technologies had accumulated without a shared theory of the danger, with gaps between federal, state and local authorities and little engagement with the public or private industry.

The public is part of the medical system

The insight with the most practical value for families is this one. A city hospital usually runs near capacity in an ordinary week. A biological emergency adds patients, plus frightened people who think they were exposed, exhausted staff, laboratory demand and the knowledge that another city may need the same scarce supplies.

The spare capacity isn't sitting in empty hospitals. It's in ordinary people. Someone who understands when to stay home preserves a bed. A family that follows isolation or medication instructions reduces confusion and transmission. A household that already has equipment, assigned and understood, doesn't spend the first hours opening unfamiliar boxes or competing for the last stock. Danzig's argument was that authorities should treat citizens as capable partners rather than a crowd to be managed after the fact.

Planning for capabilities, not pathogens

Rather than preparing for every organism, Danzig proposed a handful of representative scenarios so that planners build capabilities instead of memorizing one disease: an outdoor aerosol release over a city; a contagious disease such as smallpox; a toxin introduced into food or drink; and an animal disease affecting livestock.

That distinction matters at home too. A respirator is relevant to something airborne. It does nothing about contaminated food, and it doesn't replace antibiotics, vaccines, antitoxins or medical care. Our guide to biological threats and respiratory protection is honest about where the line falls.

What campaign thinking changes for a household

The question stops being "what if there's an incident near me?" and becomes "what if this goes on for weeks, with the health system under growing strain and the public increasingly frightened?" That shifts the emphasis from equipment to endurance:

  • Enough food, water and medication to stay home for a couple of weeks without shopping.
  • A way to get reliable information, and the discipline to follow it rather than rumor.
  • A plan for who looks after whom, including elderly relatives.
  • Respiratory protection already in the house, fitted to each person: the Israeli 4A1 for clean-shaven adults, the Sapphire hood for beards and glasses, and youth masks or powered hoods for children, with spare sealed filters.

Protective equipment ordered after public concern has risen may not arrive before it's needed. Andy Weber's work on deterrence by denial makes the complementary point: a population that absorbs an attack removes the reason to launch one.

Frequently asked questions

What did Danzig mean by reload capability?

That a biological attacker may be able to produce more material and strike again, unlike an attacker whose weapon is consumed in use.

Why does that change planning?

Because resources and reassurance have to be managed across possible future attacks, not just the one that's happened.

What can a household actually do?

Be able to stay home for a couple of weeks, follow official instructions, and have protection already fitted to each person.

About this article: it draws on "Preparing for Catastrophic Bioterrorism: Toward a Long-Term Strategy for Limiting the Risk" by Richard Danzig, National Defense University Press, and on CDC and FBI material on the 2001 anthrax letters. Richard Danzig, the US Navy, the Department of Defense, the National Defense University, the CDC and the FBI are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed it or its products. Analysis and recommendations are by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM. Former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch and former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority.

Primary Sources

  • Richard Danzig — "Preparing for Catastrophic Bioterrorism: Toward a Long-Term Strategy for Limiting the Risk," National Defense University Press
  • CDC — Anthrax and the 2001 Anthrax Letters Investigation
  • FBI — Amerithrax Investigation
  • CDC/NIOSH — CBRN Respirator Certification and Use

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM; former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch; former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority. Richard Danzig, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, the National Defense University, and NIOSH are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or its products.

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