Gary Ackerman: Why a Small CBRN Incident Can Cause Enormous Disruption
The phrase "weapon of mass destruction" pushes the imagination toward the largest possible event. Gary Ackerman argues that this framing hides a more practical problem. Chemical, biological and radiological materials can be used on a much smaller scale, nowhere near the technical definition of a weapon of mass destruction, and still force evacuations, close transport systems, contaminate buildings and generate fear far beyond the number of people harmed.
An incident can fail as mass destruction and succeed as mass disruption. For anyone making plans, that's the more useful thing to prepare for.
The researcher
Gary Ackerman is an associate professor in emergency preparedness and homeland security, and founding director of the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division at START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. His approach starts from behavior rather than spectacle: what is an actor actually trying to achieve, what resources do they have, and could something far smaller deliver the attention, fear or disruption they want?
CBRN is a category; WMD is a consequence
This is Ackerman's central distinction, and it clears up a lot of confusion. A chemical, biological or radiological agent doesn't become a weapon of mass destruction because it sounds frightening. Quantity, delivery, target, weather and competence decide whether an incident causes local injury, wide disruption or catastrophe. For small groups, the lower end of that scale is much more attainable, because the hard parts of a mass-casualty weapon, secure facilities and engineering expertise, aren't needed.
So the useful planning question isn't "could this destroy a city?" It's "could this close the building, station, school, hospital entrance or depot that people depend on?"
The agent isn't the weapon
Ackerman separates the harmful material from the problem of delivering it. Something dangerous still has to be moved, released, kept potent and brought into contact with people, without disabling the operation first. Historically, delivery rather than access to a frightening material has been the decisive barrier.
That has a consumer-protection implication too. A canister labeled for broad hazards doesn't mean its owner can safely enter any contaminated environment. The label is not the capability.
Why smaller chemical incidents are the most plausible
In databases of non-state CBRN activity, chemical incidents are the largest category. Not because nerve agents are easy to make, but because the chemical spectrum includes ordinary toxic industrial materials that already exist in transport, manufacturing, agriculture and water treatment.
A deliberate release can also look exactly like an accident for the first few minutes. People report a smell, burning eyes, coughing or an unexplained cloud, without knowing whether the cause is malicious, industrial or domestic. Usefully, the protective action is the same either way: increase distance, stay out of the plume and out of enclosed spaces, follow official instructions, and don't walk toward the source to find out. Our guide on evacuating or sheltering in place covers the decision, and gas masks for chlorine and ammonia the industrial side.
Where a mask helps is narrow and worth stating precisely: for a clean-shaven adult, leaving a known, oxygen-sufficient environment, a correctly chosen full-face mask reduces inhalation and eye exposure. Every word there is a limit. "Known" means the filter is documented for that hazard. "Oxygen-sufficient" means not a fire or a confined space. "Leaving" means moving away, not searching the building or filming.
Disruption without destruction: two mail cases
The 2001 anthrax letters killed five people and made seventeen ill. The investigation ran to more than ten thousand interviews, thousands of environmental samples and new forensic methods, while mail systems, congressional offices, media organizations and public health agencies all worked under biological uncertainty. The casualty count doesn't capture the institutional cost.
The ricin letters sent to senior US officials in 2013 show the same asymmetry at a smaller scale. Nobody fell ill. Buildings were sealed, public health authorities activated, and specialist teams carried out evidence collection and testing. The disruption was real even though the destruction wasn't.
Radiological incidents are mostly about disruption
Ackerman makes the same point about radiological scenarios: severe anxiety and economic disruption even where immediate radiation injuries would be limited. A district gets cordoned off, transport stops, property is surveyed and surfaces are cleaned while specialists map contamination. The public can't see radiation, and ordinary instincts don't indicate danger.
Which is why we're careful in how we describe our own products. A mask with a HEPA particle filter, such as the Israeli 4A1 or the Sapphire hood, reduces inhalation of radioactive dust. It does not shield the body from penetrating radiation, and nobody should sell it as protection against "radiation" without saying so. See what a dirty bomb would do.
A plan does more than equipment
The characteristics that make CBRN attractive to an attacker, Ackerman notes, are psychological: the hazard is invisible, invasive, sometimes delayed, and poorly understood. Uncertainty spreads far outside any contaminated area. A closed station affects commuters who were never exposed.
That means calm, accurate information is itself a defense. An organization that knows who shuts off the ventilation, who calls emergency services and which room can be isolated is much less likely to turn a limited event into a large one. A mask protects one person's airway under defined conditions. A plan stops the incident growing. Our guide to institutional CBRN planning sets out what such a plan contains, and Dan Kaszeta's work on police and security readiness covers the responder side.
Frequently asked questions
What's the difference between CBRN and WMD?
CBRN describes a category of hazard. WMD describes a scale of consequence. Most CBRN incidents don't reach it.
Why are chemical incidents the most common?
Because toxic industrial chemicals are already present in ordinary life, in transport, farming and manufacturing.
Does a gas mask protect against radiation?
It keeps radioactive dust out of your lungs. It doesn't block radiation, which requires shelter and distance.
About this article: it draws on research by Gary Ackerman and colleagues published through START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, and on CDC and NIOSH guidance. Gary Ackerman, START, the University of Maryland, the CDC and NIOSH are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed it or its products. Analysis and recommendations are by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM. Former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch and former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority.
Primary Sources
- Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome — "CBRN Terrorism: Motivations, Capabilities and Current Trends," START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland
- CDC — Chemical Emergency Response: Get Away, Get Clean, Get Help
- CDC/NIOSH — Respirators that Protect Against CBRN Hazards
Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM; former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch; former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority. Gary Ackerman, START, the University of Maryland, and the other cited authors and institutions did not sponsor, review, or endorse this article.