The Half of Syria's Program Nobody Inspected: Dany Shoham on Biological Weapons

Chemical weapons leave evidence. Investigators can recover munition fragments, sample soil, identify precursors and inspect production equipment. Biological programs are much harder to expose, because the laboratory that makes vaccines can also grow dangerous organisms, and the fermenter used for medicines looks the same whatever is in it.

That asymmetry is the subject of an assessment published in March 2025 by Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, a former senior analyst in IDF Military Intelligence and Israel's Ministry of Defense, with the Begin-Sadat Center. His argument: international effort has concentrated almost entirely on Syria's chemical arsenal, while the biological side of the former government's program has gone largely unexamined, and the window to look was closing.

Why one half got inspected and the other didn't

This is partly institutional, and it's the most useful thing in the analysis for a general reader. The Chemical Weapons Convention is implemented by the OPCW, which has inspectors, designated laboratories and an established verification system. The Biological Weapons Convention has no equivalent body. There is no standing inspectorate able to enter a country, identify every biological facility and certify that a national program has been dismantled.

So Syria's chemical file has been investigated for more than a decade, with real results: declared stockpiles destroyed, attacks attributed, and in May 2026 the discovery of substantial undeclared munitions and documents. No comparable operation exists for the biological question, in Syria or anywhere else.

What Shoham assesses

His assessment is that Syria built a strategic structure in which ballistic missiles and unconventional weapons reinforced one another, with an indigenous chemical arsenal from the 1980s and a biological component added later, centered on the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center operating under scientific cover, with work distributed across military, pharmaceutical and veterinary institutions.

These are professional intelligence judgments, and most haven't been confirmed by unrestricted international inspection. Shoham's point is that this uncertainty isn't evidence of absence. It's a demonstration of why biological programs are hard to identify.

The dual-use problem, concretely

Biological research isn't inherently suspicious. Every country needs laboratories to diagnose infections, make vaccines and medicines, protect livestock and run public health surveillance. The equipment involved, incubators, freezers, centrifuges, culture and fermentation systems, serves all of those purposes.

What distinguishes legitimate work from prohibited work usually isn't visible in the equipment. It's which organism or toxin is involved, in what quantity, under whose command, with what degree of secrecy, and whether inspectors can get full access. A chemical warhead is hard to pass off as a hospital project. A laboratory is not.

Shoham illustrates this with ricin, a toxin from castor beans that sits on the boundary between the two treaties, since the Chemical Weapons Convention also covers certain toxins. He assesses that a production capability existed under the cover of a civilian castor-oil project, at a facility that was ultimately destroyed as part of the chemical disarmament process. His observation is the general one: destroying a production site doesn't account for what may already have left it, and the surrounding biological facilities weren't part of that operation.

Why a biological event is harder to recognize

A chemical attack often announces itself: a smell, a visible cloud, immediate irritation, people collapsing, contaminated munitions on the ground. A biological release may look like nothing at all. People can be exposed without knowing, symptoms may take hours or days, and by then those affected have scattered. The World Health Organization notes that a deliberate biological event may closely resemble a natural outbreak, which complicates both response and attribution.

That ambiguity is itself part of the damage: enormous fear and disruption can build before anyone establishes what happened or why.

What this means for a household

A mask doesn't give immunity and doesn't cover every route of exposure. It doesn't replace vaccination, treatment, hygiene or public health instructions, which in a biological event usually matter more. What a sealed full-face mask with a HEPA-class particle filter does is reduce inhalation of airborne biological particles, and protect the eyes, which are a route of infection for some agents. That's useful while moving to shelter, evacuating or caring for someone ill.

The wider lesson is about uncertainty rather than equipment. Biological threats can exist long before any government can confirm them publicly, events can look natural at first, and protective equipment becomes hard to get only after concern has risen. So the preparation that works is the kind completed in advance: the Israeli 4A1 for clean-shaven adults, the Sapphire hood for beards and glasses, the Quartz hood for young children and the Multipro for babies, plus the ability to stay home for a couple of weeks. Our guide to biological threats and respiratory protection covers what filters do, and the chemical side of the Syrian file covers the rest of the story.

Frequently asked questions

Why has Syria's biological program not been inspected?

Because the Biological Weapons Convention has no verification organization or standing inspectorate, unlike the chemical convention.

Is it confirmed that Syria had biological weapons?

No. Shoham's assessment is a professional intelligence judgment, not an internationally adjudicated finding.

Would a gas mask help in a biological event?

A HEPA-class filter stops airborne germs while you wear it. Vaccination, treatment and public health measures matter more.

About this article: it draws on "Disarming Syria Under the Al-Julani Regime: The Biological Weapons Dimension" by Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,339, March 2025, and on WHO guidance on biological events. Dr. Shoham, the Begin-Sadat Center, the IDF, Israel's Ministry of Defense, the WHO and the OPCW are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed it or its products. Analysis and recommendations are by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM. Former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch and former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority.

Primary Sources

  • Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham — "Disarming Syria Under the Al-Julani Regime — The Biological Weapons Dimension," BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,339, March 31, 2025
  • World Health Organization — Biological Events and Public Health Emergency Preparedness

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM; former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch; former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority. Dr. Dany Shoham, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, the IDF, the WHO, and the OPCW are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or any product offered by it.

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