Shabtai Shavit: Iran's Strategy Was Never Only About the Bomb

Public discussion of Iran's strategic threat has concentrated on one question: will Iran get a nuclear weapon? The late Shabtai Shavit, who directed the Mossad from 1989 to 1996, thought that question was too narrow.

In public interviews he argued that Iran's experience in the eight-year war with Iraq drove a much broader decision. On his assessment, the Iranian leadership didn't pursue nuclear capability alone. It sought a whole spectrum of unconventional power: ballistic missiles, chemical and biological capabilities, and cyber operations. That changes the shape of the problem. Even if one program is delayed, damaged or constrained by diplomacy, the rest of the system remains.

Who he was

Shavit spent more than three decades in the Mossad before heading it, including intelligence work in Iran before the Islamic Revolution. He served earlier in Sayeret Matkal and later advised Israeli national security institutions. His years as director covered the end of the Cold War, the 1991 Gulf War and Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, Iran's growing regional influence and accelerating missile proliferation. He died in 2022.

The war that shaped Iranian thinking

Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against Iranian forces during the Iran-Iraq war, something UN investigations and OPCW historical material document. Iranian soldiers and civilians suffered mustard and nerve agent exposure, with respiratory, eye and skin injuries, chronic illness and deaths years afterwards. Iran still treats survivors of those attacks decades later.

Shavit's assessment was that this experience helped trigger a strategic decision in Tehran: a country without an effective counterweight could be attacked with chemical weapons while the international system offered little practical protection. Whatever one thinks of the conclusions drawn, the experience itself is a matter of record, and it's a reminder that Iran is one of the few countries where large numbers of people have actually lived through chemical warfare.

Why the parts reinforce each other

Shavit identified several elements as a system rather than a list. Nuclear capability provides deterrence and status. Missiles provide reach and speed. Chemical agents can deny ground or force people out of positions with relatively small quantities. Biological agents are hard to detect and attribute, and may resemble a natural outbreak. Cyber capability can disrupt infrastructure and emergency response without a shot being fired.

The point for a civilian isn't that all of these would be used together. It's that disrupting one doesn't neutralize the others.

Why missiles matter to chemical defense

Material in a laboratory is dangerous. Paired with a delivery system it becomes strategic. And a missile program creates uncertainty about what an incoming warhead contains: civil defense authorities may have to respond before anyone knows whether a strike involved explosives, an industrial chemical, a warfare agent or something else.

That uncertainty has its own value to an adversary. It forces the other side to maintain detection, medical capacity, shelters, protective equipment and specialist teams, whether or not an unconventional warhead ever appears.

The blind spot

Focusing only on enrichment can hide other things. Nuclear programs need large facilities, distinctive equipment and complex monitoring, which also makes them visible. Chemical and biological capability can be smaller and more distributed, and can sit inside universities, pharmaceutical companies, medical laboratories and agricultural research centers, where most of the work is genuinely legitimate. Deciding when dual-use knowledge crosses into weapons development is the hard part, and it's hard by design. Dany Shoham's assessment of Iran's chemical and biological capabilities covers the same ground in more detail.

Deterrence doesn't protect civilians from everything

Shavit emphasized the political value of capability: a state with powerful weapons expands its influence by making every confrontation more dangerous, and proxies can operate under that protection.

But even where leaders are deterred from using their most destructive options, civilians remain exposed to what happens below that threshold: conventional missile attacks, strikes on industrial facilities, accidental chemical releases, drones, sabotage and miscalculation. Living within range of strategic weapons isn't the same as being protected by the fact that they're unlikely to be used. The attacks on Israel in 2025 and on Gulf states in 2026 were conventional, and still put refineries and homes in the same frame.

What follows for a family

This is an assessment, not a prediction, and the sensible response is to prepare for a range of emergencies rather than one weapon:

  • A shelter plan that covers both blast, which means going low, and gas, which means going high and sealing up. See setting up a safe room.
  • A mask or hood for every person, including infants and children, fitted in advance: the Israeli 4A1, the Sapphire hood for beards and glasses, the 10A1 with blower for ages 8 to 14, the Quartz hood for 2 to 8 and the Multipro for babies.
  • Filters chosen on documented performance, kept sealed.
  • An understanding that respiratory protection is one layer among shelter, decontamination, evacuation and communication. Our guide to the missile threat covers the rest.

Frequently asked questions

What was Shavit's main argument?

That Iran pursued a spectrum of unconventional capabilities, not only nuclear weapons, so disrupting one program doesn't remove the threat.

Why does the Iran-Iraq war matter here?

Because Iranian forces and civilians were attacked with chemical weapons during it, which on his assessment shaped later strategic decisions.

Does deterrence protect civilians?

Only against the most extreme scenarios. Conventional attacks, industrial damage and accidents remain.

About this article: it draws on public interviews given by the late Shabtai Shavit, former Director of the Mossad, and on OPCW historical material on chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war. The interpretation here is ours. Shabtai Shavit, the Mossad, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University and the OPCW are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed it or its products. Analysis and recommendations are by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM. Former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch and former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority.

Primary Sources

  • The late Shabtai Shavit — Former Director of the Mossad. Public interview, 2020, concerning Iran's strategic weapons program and the legacy of the Iran-Iraq War.
  • International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University — Shabtai Shavit biographical profile
  • OPCW — Historical overview of Iraqi chemical-weapons use during the Iran-Iraq War

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen - founder of CBRNMASKS.COM; former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch; former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority. The late Shabtai Shavit, the Mossad, and the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or any product it offers.

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