Glenn Cross on the Biological Shadow War: Small, Targeted and Deniable

A senior official leaves a meeting in good health. By evening he has a fever. By morning he's in intensive care, and his doctors see an aggressive infection or an organ failure they can't explain. There was no bomb, no suspicious package and no declaration of war. The first question is medical. The question of who wanted it to happen comes much later.

That delay, argues Dr. Glenn Cross, is the point. Cross was the US Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation, responsible for biological weapons analysis on the National Intelligence Council, and now runs Crossbow Analytics. In an essay for War on the Rocks in 2021 he set out what he thinks the realistic modern biological threat looks like, and it isn't the Hollywood version.

Why the apocalypse scenario is the less likely one

Cross doesn't expect a state to release a contagious super-pathogen hoping to kill millions. Large biological attacks are hard to control, hard to deliver reliably and dangerous to the country that launches them, including to its own population. For destroying military targets, conventional weapons are more predictable and less politically explosive.

The quiet use of biology is different. Its value to an intelligence service lies in being small, targeted and deniable. The objective might be one dissident, one commander, one airfield or one port, not a population. Removing a person who holds unique knowledge, or making a facility stop work for a week, doesn't require anything resembling a weapons arsenal.

Designed to look like something else

Cross's background argument is that dual-use research has repeatedly defeated intelligence services. Western governments misjudged the scale of the Soviet program, of Iraq's before the Gulf War, and of smaller programs in Rhodesia, South Africa and Chile. Large-scale weaponization and testing eventually becomes visible. The earlier, quieter stages look much like ordinary science.

The same ambiguity persists after use. An unexplained illness doesn't arrive with a flag on it. Laboratories have to identify the agent, investigators have to reconstruct the exposure, and agencies have to decide whether it was natural, accidental or deliberate. A state planning a covert operation doesn't need attribution to be impossible. It only needs it to be slow.

The umbrella on Waterloo Bridge

History has a model. In September 1978, the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov felt a sharp pain in his leg near Waterloo Bridge in London and died several days later. British government scientists identified ricin in a tiny pellet that had been injected into his thigh, in an attack remembered for the modified umbrella.

No mask would have helped Markov. That's exactly why the case matters here. "Biological protection" isn't one product. What protects you depends entirely on how an agent would reach the body. A toxin injected under the skin, a contaminated meal and an aerosol released through ventilation are three different problems, and a respirator is highly relevant to one of them.

The 2001 letters: small quantity, national effect

The anthrax letters mailed in the United States in 2001 killed five people and infected seventeen. The amount of material was tiny compared with a military program. The effect wasn't: mail facilities disrupted, government offices treated as contamination scenes, and one of the most complex investigations in FBI history. A biological event doesn't have to spread across a city to make a whole country feel exposed.

The first warning may be medical

A covert attack reverses the usual order of an emergency. The people who first realize something is wrong are emergency doctors, infection-control nurses or laboratory technicians. The early patients may have nothing obvious in common. Staff may keep working inside an exposure area because nobody has declared it dangerous yet.

For people who work in ports, airports, diplomatic buildings, data centers, hospitals or security teams, the practical questions are about procedure rather than equipment: how do you report a concern, who issues instructions, where do you seek medical help, and what are you actually trained to use? Don't try to investigate a suspected contaminated area yourself. Our guide to institutional CBRN planning covers how organizations prepare for that gap between suspicion and identification.

Where a mask fits, and where it doesn't

A full-face mask with a particle filter protects against airborne hazards: it reduces what you breathe in and covers the eyes, a route of exposure for some agents. A powered hood such as the Sapphire does the same without needing a face seal, which matters for beards, and is easier to wear for hours. For clean-shaven adults, the 4A1 is simpler.

What a mask can't do is stop an injected toxin, make contaminated food safe, prevent exposure through a wound, or substitute for an antidote, antibiotic, vaccine or treatment. It covers the airborne route. In the kind of targeted operations Cross describes, that may not be the route at all, which is worth being clear-eyed about. Our guide to biological threats and respiratory protection goes through the detail.

Frequently asked questions

Is a mass-casualty biological attack the main threat?

Cross argues it isn't the most likely one. Small, targeted, deniable use is more attractive to a state because it's controllable and hard to attribute.

Would a gas mask have helped Georgi Markov?

No. The toxin was injected. Protection depends on the route of exposure.

What should an employee do if they suspect an exposure at work?

Follow the workplace emergency plan, report it, get medical advice, and don't investigate the area.

About this article: it draws on "Biological Weapons in the 'Shadow War'" by Dr. Glenn Cross, War on the Rocks, November 2021, on UK government material about the identification of ricin in the Markov case, and on the FBI's account of its anthrax investigation. Dr. Cross, War on the Rocks, the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the FBI are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed it or its products. Analysis and recommendations are by David Magen, founder of CBRNMASKS.COM. Former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch and former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority.

Primary Sources

  • Dr. Glenn Cross — "Biological Weapons in the 'Shadow War,'" War on the Rocks, November 9, 2021
  • UK Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) — Historical timeline: Georgi Markov assassination and identification of ricin
  • FBI — Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation
  • CDC/NIOSH — Powered Air-Purifying Respirators

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen - founder of CBRNMASKS.COM; former combat research officer in the IDF Training and Doctrine Branch; former reserve officer in Israel's National Emergency Authority. Dr. Glenn Cross, the U.S. Intelligence Community, War on the Rocks, Dstl, and the FBI are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or its products.

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