Iran's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Dr. Dany Shoham

Editorial disclosure: this article is based primarily on a publicly published assessment by Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham: "Deprived of Nukes, Iran Will Likely Ramp Up Its Chemical and Biological Weapons Capacities," BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,379, April 26, 2026. The Iranian-program assessments and allegations described below are attributed to Dr. Shoham's publicly published analysis. CBRNMASKS.COM has not independently verified classified or non-public intelligence claims. Dr. Dany Shoham and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed CBRNMASKS.COM or any product sold by it. Analysis, preparedness conclusions, and product recommendations are by David Magen alone.

Stopping a nuclear weapons program does not necessarily eliminate the strategic threat behind it. It may simply redirect that threat toward weapons that are easier to conceal, less expensive to manufacture, and potentially difficult to identify before they are used.

Former Senior IDF Military Intelligence Analyst Dr. Dany Shoham Warns: Iran May Shift Toward Chemical and Biological Weapons

That is the central warning raised by Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, a former senior analyst in IDF Military Intelligence and Israel's Ministry of Defense who specializes in chemical and biological warfare in the Middle East and worldwide. In a public assessment published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies on April 26, 2026, Dr. Shoham argues that damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear and ballistic infrastructure could push the Islamic regime to place significantly greater emphasis on chemical, biological, and possibly radiological weapons. His assessment is not that Iran's strategic ambitions have disappeared — it is that those ambitions may now be redirected.

This analysis is best read alongside when to evacuate or shelter in place and Shabtai Shavit's assessment of Iran's CBRN strategy. Together, they connect the threat picture with its operational and civilian-preparedness implications.

From a Nuclear Strategy to a Broader Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction Strategy

According to Shoham's assessment, if Iran is prevented from achieving an operational nuclear arsenal, the regime is likely to expand the alternative strategic capabilities it already possesses or has been developing: chemical warfare agents, biological agents, toxic pharmaceutical substances, and potentially radiological payloads.

These capabilities should not be viewed as isolated scientific projects. Shoham describes a broad network linking military research centers, universities, pharmaceutical facilities, engineering institutions, and organizations controlled by Iran's Ministry of Defense and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He believes this network has already created both traditional and more advanced generations of chemical and biological weapons.

A Distributed Research and Development Network

Shoham identifies six Iranian facilities whose chemical- and biological-related activities were reportedly affected during Israeli and American attacks in 2025 and 2026: Malek-Ashtar University of Technology; Imam Hussein University; Shahid Beheshti University; Iran University of Science and Technology; Tofigh Daru Research and Engineering Company; and the Shahid Meisami Research Center.

Some operate directly under military or Revolutionary Guard command. Others appear to be civilian universities, medical institutes, or pharmaceutical companies while conducting dual-use research with possible military applications. Shoham associates these facilities with fields including toxic pharmaceutical agents, incapacitating chemicals, pathogen research, genetic engineering, aerosol technology, delivery mechanisms, and the development of chemical and biological payloads.

This distributed structure is important: a program spread among universities, laboratories, pharmaceutical companies, and military research centers is much more difficult to eliminate than one concentrated in a single installation. Even serious damage to several facilities may therefore delay development without permanently ending it.

Pharmaceutical Agents as Weapons

One of the most immediate concerns in Shoham's paper is Iran's reported development of pharmaceutical-based chemical agents — powerful medical substances that can produce sedation, disorientation, paralysis, unconsciousness, or death depending on the agent, dose, and method of exposure. Shoham specifically discusses research involving fentanyl-related compounds and medetomidine, and assesses that Iranian organizations have explored ways to disperse these agents through tactical systems.

He connects this research to reported symptoms during the suppression of protests inside Iran, including sudden collapse, anesthesia-like sensations, disorientation, impaired movement, and delayed medical consequences. Iran has denied using chemical agents against protesters. The incidents and their causes remain contested, and Shoham's conclusions should be understood as his professional intelligence assessment rather than as an independently adjudicated finding.

The Novichok Question

Shoham also focuses on Iranian research involving Novichok nerve agents. According to his assessment, researchers working at an Iranian defense chemical laboratory synthesized several Novichok-related compounds and generated analytical data that was later incorporated into an OPCW database. The publicly declared purpose of such work was identification, verification, and chemical-weapons monitoring. Shoham argues, however, that the research also gave Iran scientific knowledge and direct experience involving some of the world's most dangerous nerve agents — illustrating the central problem of dual-use research.

Iran has been a member of the OPCW since the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force in 1997, and Iranian representatives publicly state that the country complies with the Convention. Shoham's assessment is that covert military development has continued despite those formal commitments.

The Biological Threat May Be Even Harder to Detect

Chemical attacks can sometimes produce immediate and visible symptoms. A biological attack may remain unnoticed until infected people begin becoming ill hours or days later. Shoham argues that Iran's biological warfare research has progressed beyond traditional bacteria and toxins toward more advanced agents and technologies, including: highly toxic natural substances and engineered toxin-delivery systems; smallpox-related viruses; hemorrhagic fever viruses; highly pathogenic avian influenza; traditional biological agents associated with anthrax, plague, botulism, and tularemia; and genetic engineering and advanced biotechnology.

Shoham's concern arises from the combination of dual-use research, military control, secrecy, and Iran's broader strategic weapons infrastructure — making biological warfare particularly difficult for intelligence services to assess, and particularly difficult for civilians to prepare for.

From Laboratories to Missiles and Drones

Shoham believes Iran has worked on all components of a functional weapons program: storage, stability, delivery, and effective dispersal. He describes what he considers a first generation of Iranian chemical and biological weapons based on traditional agents and unitary warheads, followed by continuing improvements in agent quality, dispersal technology, unmanned delivery systems, and missile range.

Of particular concern is Iran's demonstrated ability to deliver cluster-type conventional warheads. Shoham assesses that Iran may have attempted to adapt cluster delivery systems for chemical or biological payloads. He also warns that restrictions on Iran's domestic missile production may not end the danger — Iran could potentially modify remaining warheads or seek missiles and empty payload sections from allied states.

Why This Assessment Matters to Civilians

Missiles and drones aimed at military installations do not always remain confined to military areas. Interception debris, targeting errors, changing wind conditions, and attacks against civilian infrastructure can expose communities located far from the intended target. Chemical and biological threats create several additional challenges:

  • Warning time may be extremely short. A mask stored in a distant basement or sealed inside complicated packaging may not be useful when it is needed immediately.
  • The hazard may be invisible. Some dangerous agents have no reliable odor or visual warning.
  • Different hazards require different protection. A particulate filter, industrial vapor cartridge, and military-type combined filter are not interchangeable.
  • A mask must seal correctly. Even an appropriate filter cannot compensate for a poor facial seal, damaged valve, incorrect size, or facial hair beneath the sealing surface.
  • Children are not small adults. An adult gas mask should not simply be placed on an infant or young child. Children require equipment specifically designed for their anatomy and breathing capacity.
  • Respiratory protection is only one layer. Sheltering, evacuation, decontamination, medical treatment, and official emergency instructions may be equally or more important.

What a Gas Mask Can — and Cannot — Do

A properly selected full-face respirator can help protect the respiratory system, eyes, and face from specified airborne hazards when: the mask is in serviceable condition; the wearer achieves a proper seal; the installed filter is suitable for the particular substance; the concentration and environment are within the equipment's intended limitations; and the equipment is put on before significant exposure occurs.

A gas mask does not make the wearer invulnerable. An air-purifying respirator does not generate oxygen and should not be used in an oxygen-deficient environment. It may not be suitable where the identity or concentration of the substance is unknown, and it does not protect exposed skin from agents that can be absorbed through the body. No responsible seller should describe one mask or filter as a universal solution for every chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear scenario.

Building a Practical Family Respiratory-Protection Kit

A family plan should account for every member of the household rather than purchasing one type of mask and assuming it will fit everyone.

Adults: the Israeli 4A1 / Black Diamond Simplex is a lightweight full-face mask manufactured in Israel, using a standard 40mm threaded filter connection with panoramic visor and hydration port. Product condition, packaging, and included components should always be checked on the individual product page.

Children, ages 2–8: the MAMTAK / Quartz child PAPR hood uses a protective hood and powered blower to create positive airflow, designed for children around ages 2 to 8. It does not depend on the same tight facial seal required by a conventional adult mask.

Infants and toddlers, ages 0–2: the Multipro infant protection system is designed for very young children who cannot reliably fit, tighten, or clear a standard gas mask by themselves.

Filters: a household should consider keeping additional sealed M80 40mm CBRN/NBC filters in protected storage. Filters must be kept dry, physically undamaged, and within the conditions stated by the manufacturer. The words "40mm" or "NATO" describe the connection standard — they do not prove that every filter protects against every hazard.

Explore the Israeli CBRN Family Bundle or the complete range at CBRNMASKS.COM.

Preparation Before the Emergency

Owning respiratory equipment is not enough. Before an emergency: assign equipment to each family member; inspect the mask, hood, straps, valves, and visor; keep filters sealed until required; learn how to connect the filter; test powered blowers and keep required batteries available; store instructions with the equipment; avoid placing equipment in extreme heat, direct sunlight, or locations that are difficult to reach; and follow civil-defense and emergency-service instructions during any real incident.

Shoham's Warning Should Not Be Dismissed

Dr. Shoham's assessment does not claim that every Iranian research project is offensive or that a chemical or biological attack is inevitable. Its message is more strategic: Iran has accumulated scientific expertise, military infrastructure, and delivery capabilities across chemical, biological, and potentially radiological fields. If the regime's nuclear path remains blocked, those alternative capabilities may become more — not less — important to Iranian strategic planning.

Facilities can be rebuilt. Scientists can be transferred. Dual-use research can be concealed inside civilian institutions. The destruction of infrastructure may buy time. It does not necessarily remove the knowledge, intent, or organizational network behind it. For families, the answer is not panic — it is measured preparation: appropriate equipment, realistic expectations, accessible storage, and an understanding of what respiratory protection can and cannot accomplish.

Protect Your Family

4A1 for adults, Sapphire for beards, MAMTAK / Quartz for ages 2–8, Multipro for infants. Sealed 40mm filters for every mask. Israeli CBRN Family Bundle for the complete household. CBRNMASKS.COM — Israeli civil-defense equipment, in service since 2009.

Primary Source

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen — former Combat Investigation Officer, Doctrine and Training Division, IDF Operations Directorate; former Staff Officer, National Emergency Authority, continuity planning for local authorities, Haifa region. Founder of CBRNMASKS.COM since 2009. Dr. Dany Shoham and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed any product sold by it.

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