Syria's Hidden Biological-Weapons Program: Dany Shoham

Editorial disclosure: this article is based primarily on a publicly published assessment by Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham: "Disarming Syria Under the Al-Julani Regime — The Biological Weapons Dimension," BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,339, March 31, 2025. The specific activities described are Shoham's professional intelligence assessments. Many have not been independently confirmed through unrestricted international inspections. That uncertainty is not evidence that the program did not exist — it demonstrates why biological-weapons programs are so difficult to identify. Dr. Dany Shoham, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, the IDF, the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the WHO, the OPCW, and the Syrian authorities are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or any product offered by it. Analysis, preparedness conclusions, and product recommendations are by David Magen alone.

Chemical weapons leave evidence. Investigators can recover damaged rockets, sample contaminated soil, identify chemical precursors, and inspect production equipment. Biological weapons can be far more difficult to expose. The same laboratory that develops vaccines can potentially cultivate dangerous pathogens. The same fermenter used for legitimate pharmaceutical production can support prohibited activity.

Syria's Hidden Biological Weapons — The Dimension International Disarmament Has Not Addressed

This is the danger highlighted by Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, former senior analyst in IDF Military Intelligence and Israel's Ministry of Defense. In a public assessment published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies on March 31, 2025, Shoham argued that international efforts had concentrated heavily on Syria's chemical arsenal while almost entirely neglecting the biological dimension of the former Assad regime's strategic weapons program. His warning was direct: the fall of the Assad regime created a rare opportunity to identify, expose, and destroy Syria's suspected biological-weapons infrastructure — but that opportunity could disappear if laboratories, materials, records, and specialist personnel were not located quickly.

This analysis is best read alongside civilian respiratory protection against biological threats and Dany Shoham on Syria's hidden chemical weapons. Together, they connect the threat picture with its operational and civilian-preparedness implications.

The Missing Half of Syria's Weapons Program

Since 2013, Syria's chemical-weapons program has received extensive international attention. The OPCW supervised the destruction of Syria's declared chemical stockpile, investigated alleged chemical attacks, and continued pressing Syrian authorities to resolve inconsistencies in the country's declarations. After the change of government in December 2024, the new Syrian authorities committed themselves publicly to cooperating with the OPCW — and the May 2026 OPCW discovery confirmed that significant undeclared chemical materials had survived.

No comparable international operation has yet been created for Syria's suspected biological-weapons program. This is partly an institutional problem: the Chemical Weapons Convention is implemented by the OPCW, which possesses inspectors, laboratories, and an established verification system. The Biological Weapons Convention has no equivalent international verification organization and no standing inspection regime capable of entering a country, identifying every biological facility, and certifying the destruction of an entire national program. As a result, Syria's chemical file has been investigated for more than a decade while the suspected biological file has remained largely hidden.

Dr. Shoham's Central Assessment

Shoham argues that Syria developed a strategic structure in which ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and biological capabilities reinforced one another. According to his assessment, Syria began building an indigenous chemical arsenal during the 1980s and added a more advanced biological component during the following decade. He identifies the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center — commonly known as the SSRC — as the principal organization behind advanced and unconventional weapons development, operating under civilian and scientific cover. Shoham associates the wider Syrian biological network with military laboratories, pharmaceutical facilities, veterinary institutions, and other scientific organizations capable of conducting dual-use research.

The Dual-Use Problem

Biological research is not inherently suspicious. Countries require laboratories to diagnose infectious diseases, develop vaccines, manufacture medicines, protect livestock, study agricultural pathogens, and maintain public-health surveillance. The equipment involved may include incubators, freezers, centrifuges, culture systems, and fermentation equipment — all of which can serve legitimate medical or agricultural purposes, and some of which can also be misused.

The distinction between peaceful and offensive research often depends on factors that are not visible from the equipment alone: the strain or toxin being studied; the quantity being produced; the degree of secrecy; the military chain of command; the intended method of delivery; and whether inspectors can obtain full access. A chemical warhead is difficult to disguise as a hospital project. A pathogen laboratory may appear to be doing ordinary medical work while supporting a prohibited program.

Ricin and the Limits of Chemical Disarmament

One of the most significant issues raised by Shoham concerns ricin — a highly toxic substance derived from castor beans, classified as a biological toxin rather than a living infectious organism. According to Shoham, Syria developed a ricin-production capability under the cover of a civilian castor-oil project, associated with a facility at Al-Maliha near Damascus under military and SSRC supervision. The facility was ultimately destroyed as part of the international chemical-disarmament process because the Chemical Weapons Convention also covers certain toxins when intended for prohibited purposes.

Shoham argues, however, that destroying the facility did not establish what happened to all the material allegedly manufactured there during the preceding years, and that other biological facilities were not investigated as part of the chemical operation. This illustrates a critical disarmament problem: destroying a production site does not automatically account for everything that may already have left it.

Biological Weapons Are Harder to Recognize

A chemical attack often produces immediate signs: unusual odors, visible clouds, sudden respiratory irritation, rapid collapse, contaminated munitions, and environmental residues. A biological release may initially appear to be nothing more than an ordinary outbreak. People could be exposed without realizing an incident occurred. Symptoms may not appear until hours or days later, by which time exposed individuals may have traveled far from the original release area. The World Health Organization warns that a deliberate biological event may resemble a naturally occurring outbreak, making identification and response more difficult.

This delayed and ambiguous character is one reason a biological attack can create extraordinary fear and disruption even before its origin is understood.

Why the Change of Government Created an Opportunity

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 created access to facilities, personnel, classified records, and areas that had previously been closed to international inspectors. Shoham argued in March 2025 that this window was time-limited: personnel with direct knowledge of programs may disperse, move to other countries, or be recruited by other organizations. Documentation may be destroyed, concealed, or transferred. Materials may disappear before international inspectors reach them. The pace of biological disarmament must therefore be comparable to chemical disarmament — and must address the biological dimension with comparable resources and urgency.

What This Means for Respiratory Protection

A respirator cannot prevent every biological exposure route and does not provide biological immunity. It should not replace vaccination, treatment, hygiene, disease-control measures, or instructions from public-health and civil-defense authorities. What a full-face respirator with an appropriate high-efficiency particulate filter can do — in appropriate conditions and with proper fit — is reduce inhalation of airborne biological particles or aerosols. This may be a meaningful layer during movement to shelter, evacuation through uncertain air, or while following official emergency instructions in a biological incident. Full-face coverage also protects the eyes, which can be an exposure pathway for some biological material.

The wider lesson is about uncertainty. Biological threats may exist long before governments can publicly confirm them. Biological events may initially look natural. Protective equipment may become difficult to obtain only after public concern has already risen. Preparedness should therefore be completed before an emergency — not driven by panic after one begins.

Building a Practical Family Respiratory-Protection Kit

Adults: the Israeli 4A1 Black Diamond Simplex is a lightweight full-face mask manufactured in Israel, featuring a panoramic visor, standard 40mm threaded filter connection, adjustable head harness, and hydration port.

Children, ages 2–8: the MAMTAK / Quartz child PAPR hood uses a powered blower to deliver filtered positive airflow into a transparent protective hood.

Infants and toddlers, ages 0–2: the Multipro infant protection system is designed for very young children who cannot wear a standard gas mask.

Children, ages 8–14: the Israeli 10A1 child gas mask with 40mm Israeli filter and hydration tube.

Filters: CBRNMASKS.COM offers Israeli PA-12 and M80 Type 80 40mm CBRN/NBC filters. For biological-particle scenarios, a high-efficiency particulate filter is the relevant performance characteristic.

Explore the Israeli CBRN Family Bundle or the complete range at CBRNMASKS.COM.

Protect Your Family

4A1 for adults, Sapphire for beards, MAMTAK / Quartz for ages 2–8, Multipro for infants. Sealed 40mm filters for every mask. Israeli CBRN Family Bundle for the complete household. CBRNMASKS.COM — Israeli civil-defense equipment, in service since 2009.

Primary Sources

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen — former Combat Investigation Officer, Doctrine and Training Division, IDF Operations Directorate; former Staff Officer, National Emergency Authority, continuity planning for local authorities, Haifa region. Founder of CBRNMASKS.COM since 2009. Dr. Dany Shoham, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, the IDF, the WHO, and the OPCW are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or any product offered by it.

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