Former U.S. Navy Secretary: A Biological Attack May Come in Waves

Editorial disclosure: this article is based primarily on Richard Danzig's National Defense University study, "Preparing for Catastrophic Bioterrorism: Toward a Long-Term Strategy for Limiting the Risk." Richard Danzig, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, the National Defense University, CNAS, the FBI, CDC, and NIOSH are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or its products. This article does not claim that a specific biological terrorist attack is imminent. Analysis, preparedness conclusions, and product recommendations are by David Magen alone.

"Plan to defend against a campaign, not just an attack."

The letter looked ordinary until the powder escaped. It passed through offices, sorting machines, and mailrooms built for speed, not containment. The people who handled it did not hear an alarm. Some did not know they had been exposed until fever and breathing difficulty began days later. In the fall of 2001, anthrax spores mailed through the United States postal system caused 22 infections and five deaths. Most national attention focused on the horror already unfolding — who sent the letters, which buildings were contaminated, who needed antibiotics. Richard Danzig asked a darker question.

What If the Sender Had More?

What if Washington was not the end of the attack, but the first demonstration? What if another aerosol release occurred in Chicago while hospitals were still treating the first wave — followed by a third city after the country had begun to believe the emergency was contained? Danzig's warning transformed bioterrorism from an incident into a campaign. The first city would not merely be a target. It would be a message to every other city that it could be next.

This analysis is best read alongside civilian respiratory protection against biological threats and RAND on civilian biodefense and vital workers. Together, they connect the threat picture with its operational and civilian-preparedness implications.

The Former Navy Secretary Who Saw a Strategic Blind Spot

Richard Danzig served as the 71st Secretary of the United States Navy from 1998 to 2001 after previously serving as Under Secretary of the Navy. He later advised U.S. intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense, served on major national-security boards, and became a senior adviser at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. His biodefense work was not built around predicting one specific terrorist organization or pathogen. It was built around the characteristics that make biological attack strategically different from most other forms of terrorism.

In his National Defense University study, Danzig argued that the United States had accumulated programs, technologies, and agencies without creating a true strategy. He described a system with gaps between federal, state, and local authorities, insufficient engagement with the public and private industry, and no durable mechanism for forcing competing institutions to make difficult decisions together. His criticism was uncomfortable because it was not primarily about a lack of spending — it was about spending without a shared theory of the danger.

The Biological Attacker Can Reload

The September 11 attacks were catastrophic, but the aircraft were consumed in the attack. A terrorist organization capable of acquiring a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to possess dozens more ready for immediate use. Biology can create a different rhythm. A relatively small production system may generate additional material after the first release. An attacker can wait for favorable weather, choose a different city, alter the delivery method, or return to a previous target after confidence begins to recover.

Danzig called this reload capability. In his formulation, biological terrorism could become campaign terrorism: an aerosol release in one city, then another, then another. The attacker might not need to defeat the country physically — the possibility of another release could hold the country psychologically and economically hostage. Should schools reopen when another city may be attacked tomorrow? Should emergency personnel be moved to the first location, or held in reserve? Can a government reassure the public when it does not know whether the attacker is finished? The second release may cause fewer casualties than the first and still produce greater fear, because it proves that the first emergency was not contained.

A Biological Campaign Attacks the Hospital Before the Patient Arrives

A modern urban hospital often operates close to capacity during ordinary weeks. Catastrophic biological attack adds patients, frightened people who believe they were exposed, exhausted medical staff, laboratory demand, security concerns, and the possibility that another city will soon require the same scarce resources. Danzig's central insight was that professional systems alone cannot provide the necessary surge capacity. The unused capacity is not waiting in empty hospitals — it is located in ordinary citizens who will care for relatives, follow or ignore instructions, and either seek treatment appropriately or overwhelm emergency departments unnecessarily.

In a biological emergency, public behavior is not merely a communications issue — it becomes part of the medical system. A person who understands when to remain at home preserves a hospital bed. A family that follows isolation or medication instructions reduces confusion and transmission. A household that has already assigned suitable respiratory equipment does not spend the first hours of an alert opening unfamiliar boxes or competing for the last available products. Danzig urged authorities to treat citizens as capable partners rather than as a crowd to be managed after the crisis begins.

Four Doors Into the Same Catastrophe

Danzig recommended planning around representative scenarios rather than attempting to prepare equally for every organism in existence. One scenario involved an outdoor aerosol release of anthrax over a city. Another involved a contagious disease such as smallpox. A third involved botulinum toxin introduced into cold drinks. A fourth involved foot-and-mouth disease spread among livestock. Together, they forced planners to build capabilities rather than memorize a single pathogen. The same distinction matters to a household: a respirator may be relevant to an airborne aerosol. It is not the answer to contaminated food. It cannot replace antibiotics, vaccines, antitoxins, or professional medical care.

The Household Response to Campaign Thinking

Danzig's framework changes the civilian-preparedness question. The question is not only "what happens if there is a biological incident near me?" It is "what happens if there is a series of incidents, city after city, over weeks or months, during which the public-health system becomes progressively more strained and the public progressively more frightened?" In that scenario, families with equipment they understand, stored and accessible, in a home where every person has a role, are better positioned than families who planned to buy after the alert.

Respiratory equipment that sits in a cabinet, ordered after public concern has already risen, may not arrive before the relevant exposure window has closed. Protective equipment is not a consumer product for emergency shopping. It is infrastructure that must be in place before it is needed.

Building a Practical Family Respiratory-Protection Kit

Adults: the Israeli 4A1 Black Diamond Simplex — genuine Israeli full-face civil-defense mask with panoramic visor, hydration tube, and standard 40mm filter connection. For bearded users: the Israeli Sapphire PAPR hood.

Children, ages 2–8: the MAMTAK / Quartz child PAPR hood — powered filtered-air hood for younger children who cannot reliably use an adult tight-fitting mask.

Infants and toddlers, ages 0–2: the Multipro infant protection system.

Children, ages 8–14: the Israeli 10A1 child gas mask.

Filters: CBRNMASKS.COM offers Israeli PA-12 and M80 Type 80 40mm CBRN/NBC filters, available individually and in multi-filter configurations.

A biological campaign does not need to strike every city. It needs every city to believe it may be next. Explore the Israeli CBRN Family Bundle or the complete range at CBRNMASKS.COM.

Protect Your Family

4A1 for adults, Sapphire for beards, MAMTAK / Quartz for ages 2–8, Multipro for infants. Sealed 40mm filters for every mask. Israeli CBRN Family Bundle for the complete household. CBRNMASKS.COM — Israeli civil-defense equipment, in service since 2009.

Primary Sources

Analysis and preparedness conclusions by David Magen — former Combat Investigation Officer, Doctrine and Training Division, IDF Operations Directorate; former Staff Officer, National Emergency Authority, continuity planning for local authorities, Haifa region. Founder of CBRNMASKS.COM since 2009. Richard Danzig, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, the National Defense University, and NIOSH are not affiliated with CBRNMASKS.COM and have not endorsed the company or its products.

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